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Literally, Dr. Joseph Gerstein wore a wire instead of a whistle.  
Figuratively, however, Gerstein blew his metaphorical whistle to sound the 
alarm on TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. (TAP), the company that 
produces the prostate cancer drug Lupron.  TAP’s National Account 
Manager Janice Swirski and District Manager Kimberlee Chase entered 
into negotiations with Gerstein in an attempt to get Lupron added to Tufts 
University’s insurance formulary.  Since Gerstein was an urologist for 
Tufts Associated Health Maintenance Organization, Swirski and Chases 
offered him a $65,000 unrestricted grant in exchange for the reversal of his 
previous decision to only offer a cheaper but equally effective drug to Tufts 
Associated’s prostate cancer patients instead of Lupron.
1
  Instead of 
sincerely negotiating with Swirski and Chase, Gerstein wore a wire, blew 
his whistle, and alerted government officials to TAP’s bribery attempt.  The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted TAP for its attempted bribery as 
well as other fraudulent marketing and sales practices reported by another 
whistleblower, Douglas Durand, former Vice President of Sales for TAP.  
The DOJ secured a total recovery of $900 million.  Gerstein, Durand and 
Tufts Associated, whistleblowers whose tips led to the successful 
prosecution, shared a bounty award equal to seventeen percent of the total 
recovery, or $95 million.
2
 
Economically, Gerstein made the correct financial decision because 
the bounty he received from the DOJ was significantly larger than the grant 
Swirski and Chase offered him.  Morally, however, the judgment of 
whether Gerstein made the right ethical decision to report TAP to the 
government depends on the American cultural attitude
3
 toward external 
whistleblowing and pharmaceutical companies at the time the ethics are 
being judged.  A century ago, our culture would have perceived Gerstein as 
a “snitch,”
4
 an egotistical saboteur who attacked a company that provides 
 
 1.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and 
Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to 
Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm 
[hereinafter TAP Press Release] (explaining the TAP incident). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Throughout this Comment, I will use the term “cultural attitude” to refer to “a 
systematized network of opinions held by a person or persons.”  BERNARD RUBIN ET AL., BIG 
BUSINESS AND THE MASS MEDIA 169 (1977). 
 4.  “Snitch” is a colloquial word used to label a person who becomes an informer, 
particularly an informer who discloses negative information about someone they owed 
allegiance to.  See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 
563 n.1 (1999) (“‘Snitching,’ ‘substantial assistance,’ and ‘ratting’ are all synonymous with 
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life-saving medicine for cancer patients and gives thousands of jobs to 
hardworking Americans.
5
  Conversely, in 2001, when the TAP case was 
settled, popular perception of Gerstein was that he was a “savior,” a hero 
who passed up an opportunity for self-gain to support the greater good.
6
 
This Comment will focus on the evolution of cultural attitudes and 
modern laws regarding the external whistleblowing of pharmaceutical 
company employees.  Part I of this Comment will trace cultural attitudes 
from the past to the present.  I will demonstrate that the cultural shift from 
adoration to contempt for corporations has led to an opposite shift with 
regards to external whistleblowers.  American society’s perception of 
external whistleblowing has gone from past contemptuous disdain of 
“snitches” to present positive adoring of “saviors.”  The current cultural 
attitude is that these “saviors” support individuals, distrust corporations, 
and promote safe and legal corporate products and practices.  Part II of this 
Comment will show that modern statutes—the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)
7
 in particular—have evolved 
 
cooperation, if not quite interchangeable.  The Oxford English Dictionary notes that ‘snitch’ 
is slang and of obscure origin.  Its first definition is ‘A fillip on the nose,’ the second is ‘The 
Nose’ and the third is ‘An informer; one who turns King’s or Queen’s evidence.’  The first 
citation for the use of ‘snitch’ as informer is to a 1785 dictionary entry, followed by an 1800 
citation from Byron and many others.”). 
 5.  See MARCIA MICELI & JANET NEAR: BLOWING THE WHISTLE, THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 1 (1992) (noting that 
whistleblowers have been seen as “company traitors who reveal secrets for their own 
personal glorification”). 
 6.  See id. (noting that whistleblowers are often seen as heroes and corruption fighters 
“who represent society’s last line of defense against organizational misconduct.”). 
 7.  This health care reform law has been known by three names.  The legislation 
signed by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010 was titled the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 
111th Cong. (2010).  Seven days later, the President signed the Health Care Education and 
Reconciliation Act (HCERA).  Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 
4872, 111th Cong. (2010).  HCERA made significant amendments to the original version of 
PPACA.  The combined version of PPACA and HCERA health care reform laws, while 
officially still titled PPACA, is more often referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to 
distinguish between the original March 23rd version of PPACA and the March 30th 
combined version of PPACA.  See, e.g., C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL41278, PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKFORCE, QUALITY, AND RELATED 
PROVISIONS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA): SUMMARY 
AND TIMELINE (2010), available at https://www.aamc.org/download/130996/data/ph.pdf. 
pdf.  In popular culture, the law has been referred to as “Obamacare.”  Gregory Wallace, 
‘Obamacare’: The Word That Defined the Health Care Debate, CNN (June 25, 2012), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-25/politics/politics_obamacare-word-debate_1_health-
reform-law-health-care-affordable-care-act?_s=PM:POLITICS.  Initially, opponents of the 
President used “Obamacare” as a pejorative nickname, but more recently, supporters of the 
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much like attitudinal norms.  Inherent in these modern statutes is society’s 
aspiration to protect individuals, caution companies, and safeguard the 
integrity of products through the discouragement of corporate misconduct 
by way of external whistleblowing.  Part III will show that Dodd-Frank and 
the ACA directly reflect the increased cultural attitudinal acceptance of 
external whistleblowing, and these Acts will have a tangible impact on 
pharmaceutical companies.  I argue that due to our contemporary disdain 
for pharmaceutical companies, the early twentieth century disapproval of 
external whistleblowing in American culture and law has developed into 
the current prevailing cultural and legal promotion of external employee 
whistleblowing. 
I. EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL ATTITUDES REGARDING EXTERNAL 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
The term “whistleblowing” originated from police officers blowing 
whistles to alert bystanders of the occurrence of unlawful activity.
8
  The 
term has become a legal and cultural concept that impacts employee-
employer relationships as well as the relationship corporations have with 
the general public.  The first part of this Comment will outline how the 
conception, perception and reception of external whistleblowing have 
evolved over the past one hundred years. 
A. Background on External Whistleblowing 
Although cultural attitudes about whistleblowing have changed over 
time, its definition has remained relatively constant.  Whistleblowing has 
been defined as “the disclosure by organizational members of illegal, 
immoral, or illegitimate organizational acts or omissions to parties who can 
 
President reclaimed “Obamacare” to give the term a more favorable interpretation.  Id. 
 8.  See Matthias Kleinhempel, Whistleblowing: Not An Easy Thing To Do, EFFECTIVE 
EXECUTIVE, July 2011, at 44 (“The term ‘whistleblowing’ comes from England, where 
policemen, as in many other countries around the world, used to ‘blow the whistle’ when 
they spotted illegal activity, calling the attention of both other policemen and passers-by.”).  
But see ALAN F. WESTIN, WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 
1-2 (1981) (pointing out the irony in the difference between police officer and corporate 
employees in blowing a whistle).  Westin explains that in normal situations, the person with 
the whistle has more authority than the person who the whistle is blown on, as in the case of 
police officers.  Id.  He uses the example of a referee, police officer, and lifeguard, all 
positions where “the person who has the whistle is the legally invested authority on the 
spot.”  Id.  Contrarily, “[e]mployees who complain about organization wrongdoing lack 
such power. . . . Employees who protest corporate wrongdoing are therefore not invoking 
the whistle of authority but the whistle of desperation.”  Id. at 2. 
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take action to correct the wrongdoing.”
9
  An alternative, more modern and 
less neutral definition of whistleblowing is “the act of a man or woman, 
who, believing that the public interest overrides the interest of the 
organization he serves, publicly ‘blows the whistle’ if the organization is 
involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful activity . . . .”
10
 
Beyond their similar positions as employees or affiliates of the corrupt 
company in question, whistleblowers may have little in common.  
Whistleblowers may be “Easterners, Southerners, Midwesterners, and 
Westerners.  Some are Democrats, some Republicans, and some 
Independents; in political philosophy, some are conservatives, some 
liberals, and some wholly apolitical.”
11
  In addition to being urologists like 
Gerstein, whistleblowers may come from “a wide range of occupations in 
the corporate work force—auditor, lawyer, nuclear engineer, salesperson, 
secretary, airline pilot, truck driver, construction worker, research director, 
and automotive design engineer.”
12
 
The whistle has been blown on a broad range of activities, such as 
“illegal campaign payments to public officials, dangerous nuclear reactors, 
fraudulent reports to public utility omissions, sex discrimination, unsafe 
passenger aircraft, potentially harmful drugs, sexual harassment, dangerous 
construction sites, and unsafe trucks on the highways.”
13
  Marketing fraud 
and manufacturing adulteration of pharmaceuticals are within this range of 
activities reportable to the government. 
The decision to blow the whistle may depend on the employee’s 
motives, which can vary as much as their background.  Jack Behrman, 
former Professor Emeritus at University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler 
Business School, believes that employees frequently have mixed motives 
for reporting wrongdoing.  Whistleblowers may be motivated by “a 
dedication to the organization’s stated goals, when the matter is perceived 
as being counter to those goals.”
14
  Whistleblowers may also be motivated 
by “the purposes society has for its business sector and an attempt to 
respond to those purposes by redirecting the organization’s 
 
 9.  MICELI & NEAR, supra note 5, at xv. 
 10.  WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY vii (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972).  Note that the second definition is 
characterized as “modern” because it relies on an assumption that employees consider the 
public interest when deciding whether to blow the whistle on their employer.  The first 
definition does not depend on any assumptions about the employee’s intent.  The first 
definition is simply an explanation of the actual act of blowing the whistle.  The second 
definition is an explanation of the employee’s motivations and actions. 
 11.  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 131. 
 12.  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 2. 
 13.  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 2. 
 14.  JACK BEHRMAN, ESSAYS ON ETHICS IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 140 (1988). 
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activities . . . .”
15
  Furthermore, whistleblowers may be motivated by the 
desire “‘to live with one’s own moral standards, which one perceives are 
violated by the particular situation . . . .’”
16
 
These motives may affect whether the whistleblower decides to blow 
the whistle internally or externally.  If a worker is troubled by his or her 
colleagues’ noncompliant behavior, he or she may blow the whistle to 
internal management.  If a worker seeks to redirect an entire company or 
defend the general public, the whistle may be blown externally, reporting 
violations of state or federal laws to the government.  External 
whistleblowing “can hurt the collective interest of the organization by 
damaging its image, the public face on which an appropriation usually 
depends.”
17
  For this reason, consumer protection activist Ralph Nader 
believes that “[f]ormal channels for bringing a situation to the attention of 
top management should be pursued first,” to offer companies an 
opportunity to investigate illegalities and remedy situations before financial 
and reputational damage occurs from outside exposure.
18
  However, since 
“whistleblowers may well encounter difficulties when they appeal 




Cultural attitudes have always embraced internal whistleblowing for 
the most part.
20
  However, cultural attitudes have not always embraced 
external whistleblowing.  Americans’ reaction to external whistleblowers 
has transformed over time, particularly during the twentieth century when 
society’s opinion of large corporations began to change. 
B. Early Twentieth Century Disdain for External Whistleblowing 
Before civil rights became a prominent issue in the second half of last 
century, society was more concerned with the corporation’s right to 
contribute to the financial success of the United States; thus, 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS—AND WHY 14 
(2003) (quoting Taylor Branch, Courage Without Esteem: Profiles in Whistle-Blowing, in 
CULTURE OF BUREAUCRACY 232 (Holt, Rinehart, & Winston eds., 1979)). 
 18.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 230. 
 19.  Lilanthi Ravishankar, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing in Organizations, 
MARKKULA CTR. FOR APPLIED ETHICS (2003), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submi 
tted/whistleblowing.html. 
 20.  Internal reporting has always been considered more effective than external 
whistleblowing in deterring misconduct.  Westin wrote that in the past, “employees first 
tried to voice their concerns within the company’s own channel, in the tradition of the 
organizational loyalist.”  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 2. 
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“whistleblowers . . . [who] threaten[ed] the organization’s authority 
structure, cohesiveness, and public image” were thought to threaten 
American prosperity.
21
  Alan F. Westin, professor and founder of the 
Center for Social and Legal Research,
22
 writes, “[f]rom the development of 
large corporate enterprise in the late 19th century until the middle 1960s, 
American law and public attitudes supported very broad powers of 
management in matters of both personnel administration and business 
policy.”
23
  Pharmaceutical companies in particular were offered leeway in 
their business and operational practices because “health care is seen as a 
social need, rather than a demand.”
24
  Therefore, society afforded 
pharmaceutical companies flexibility to function as providers of consumer 
health medications.
25
  In the early twentieth century, an employee who 
divulged information about a pharmaceutical company’s alleged 
wrongdoing was perceived as a “snitch,” a selfish tattletale concerned with 
personal gain over national success.
26
 
There are three prominent ways that the historical propensity to equate 
a whistleblower with a “snitch” manifested in the attitudinal norms of the 
early twentieth century.  First, at the time, loyalty to an employer was a 
shared value stemming from “the medieval concept that the ruling lords 
owed certain protection and support to their vassals in return for their 
loyalty and service in times of war.”
27
  This concept of loyalty signified that 
 
 21.  John P. Keenan, Upper-Level Managers and Whistleblowing: Determinants of 
Perceptions of Company Encouragement and Information about Where to Blow the Whistle, 
5 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 223, 223 (1990). 
 22.  Sarah D. Scalet, Privacy Q&A: Alan Westin On Protecting Corporate Data, CIO 
(June 15, 2003), http://www.cio.com/article/print/29756. 
 23.  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 4. 
 24.  BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 112. 
 25.  BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 112. 
 26.  Whistleblowers have been perceived negatively in the past.  See MICELI & NEAR, 
supra note 5, at 1 (noting that the term “whistle-blowing” often has a negative connotation 
based on society’s apprehension to approve of employees disclosing secrets and inner 
workings of the company’s they work for).  Arthur S. Miller gave the example that a tax 
evasion informer can “snitch” on someone in order to receive a percentage of the money 
recovered.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 25. 
 27.  RUBIN, supra note 3, at 103; see also WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 3 (“The 
large organization is lord and manor, and most of its employees have been desensitized 
much as were medieval peasants who never knew they were serfs.  It is true that often the 
immediate physical deprivations are far fewer, but the price of this fragile shield has been 
the dulling of the senses . . . .”); see e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 14 (“Loyalty to team 
and group has always been valued in the American culture . . . .”); WHISTLE BLOWING, supra 
note 10, at 26 (“The preeminent virtue is loyalty, and the principle is ‘your organization, 
love it or leave it.’”); BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 148 (“Such loyalty cannot be bought; it 
has to be nurtured. . . . Economically, one is supposed to be loyal above all to one’s own 
career.”). 
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supporting the success of his or her company was a worker’s contribution 
to the United States’ status as a superpower.
28
  Due to this strong cultural 
notion of employee loyalty, even Senator Charles Grassley, one of the 
biggest champions for whistleblowers, had to admit, “[u]nfortunately, 
whistleblowers are often as welcome in an agency as a skunk at a picnic.”
29
  
An arbitrator in a 1972 case proved Grassley’s point when he told an 
employee whistleblower, “you cannot ‘bite the hand that feeds you and 
insist on staying on for the banquet.’”
30
  Colleagues who felt indebted to the 
employer that offered their family sustenance and their country opulence 
often alienated a worker who blew the whistle.
31
  During the early twentieth 
century, society would have felt that Gerstein subverted national prosperity 
by impeding the ability of a pharmaceutical company that helps prolong the 
lives of cancer patients conduct its business. 
Second, past disapproval stemmed from an assumption that 
whistleblowers had adverse motives.  Condemnation resulted from a 
collective suspicion that whistleblowers might be committed to “goals 
other than those of the organization,” which lead to the company’s 
“suboptimum performance and, therefore, loss of productivity, efficiency, 
competitiveness, and ability to serve.”
32
  For example, “General MacArthur 
was sacked by President Truman for publicly disagreeing with his 
Commander in Chief.  Otto Otepka got the deep freeze for squealing to a 
congressional committee.”
33
  Because many Americans doubted the 
motives of whistleblowers, in addition to “snitch,” there were other 
“invidious terms for [a whistleblower]:  he is a ‘fink’ or a ‘stool pigeon,’ a 
 
 28.  See WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 21 (“America became great in 
engineering and production because of its entrepreneurs.”). 
 29.  151 CONG. REC. S534 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2005) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley). 
 30.  Ravishankar, supra note 19. 
 31.  JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 14. 
 32.  BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 147. 
 33.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 26.  Douglas MacArthur was removed from 
his command as general for criticizing President Truman’s Korean War strategy in a letter to 
the House of Representatives.  3 D. CLAYTON JAMES, THE YEARS OF MACARTHUR: TRIUMPH 
AND DISASTER 1945–1964 (1985).  Otto Otepka, the State Department security official 
responsible for issuing security clearances, was alienated when he decided not to give 
clearance to John F. Kennedy’s appointees whom he deemed risks to national security.  
After testifying to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee about the security risks of the 
appointees, a reporter wrote about Otepka, “‘No one speaks to the man and he speaks to no 
one.[’] . . . ‘When he enters the elevator, the conversation fades to a painful silence.  In the 
corridors, one or two people nod in polite recognition, but quickly lower their eyes.[’] . . . 
‘He sits behind his bare desk to face another morning in solitude.’ . . . Otepka is a human 
island, ostracized by all other State Department workers.”  Wes Vernon, Security Whistle-
Blowers Pay a Heavy Price, NEWSMAX.COM (June 1, 2002), http://archive.newsmax.com/ar 
chives/articles/2002/5/31/181539.shtml. 
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‘squealer’ or an ‘informer,’ or he ‘rats’ on his employer.”
34
  Ultimately, 
Americans assumed that a whistleblower was “a lowlife who betrays a 
sacred trust largely for personal gain.”
35
  A century ago, Gerstein would 
have been recognized as an opportunist who sought a large bounty as 
opposed to a modest grant.  Also, Gerstein would be recognized as a liar.  
He could have simply turned down Swirski and Chase’s offer instead of 
pretending to negotiate with them while wearing a wire. 
Third, the collective attitude before the 1970s was that external 
whistleblowing was not necessary to deter corporate misconduct.  Even 
recently, the indispensability of external whistleblowing has been doubted 
by then-Representative Johnny Isakson when he stated, “I would submit to 
my colleague it would not have taken a whistle-blower at Enron to blow it 
sky high.”
36
  Isakson’s statement is a reminder that there are other 
mechanisms to uncover wrongdoing and influence corporate governance, 
such as by “regulation, competition, [and] litigation . . . .”
37
  In the early 
twentieth century, society would have preferred Gerstein to report Swirski 
and Chase’s attempted bribe to their superiors at TAP, allow competition 
from the lower-priced drug to force Lupron out of the market, or encourage 
Tufts Associated patients to advocate for themselves in court. 
C. Contemporary Cultural Acceptance and Encouragement of 
External Whistleblowing 
During the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first century, “[l]arge American corporations . . . [began to] fac[e] new and 
at times unprecedented social and economic changes which make public 
accounting and accountability absolutely necessary.”
38
  The social change 
 
 34.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 26. 
 35.  Ravishankar, supra note 19. 
 36.  149 CONG. REC. H4067 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Rep. John Isakson). 
 37.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 4. 
 38.  RUBIN, supra note 3, at xiii.  For a more developed overview of society’s changes 
in the 1960s and 1970s, see WESTIN, supra note 8, at 6 (“During the 1960s and ‘70s, a series 
of events and developments took place that shattered these traditional assumptions and 
drastically altered social attitudes toward the conduct of corporate affairs.  The rise of the 
consumer movement of the ‘60s focused on dangerous and substandard products, 
challenging the adequacy of consumer protection under the existing regulatory agency 
system.  The equality movements first attacked racial discrimination and then sex and age 
discrimination in corporate employment.  New findings were made and widely publicized 
about perils to employee life and health from harmful substances used in the workplace, as 
well as growing threats of radiation and chemical damage to people living in communities 
near many types of industrial plants. . . . Throughout this period changes in social values 
about sex, life-styles, and political beliefs altered the public’s sense of the proper line to be 
drawn between private and public matters . . . .”). 
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that pharmaceutical companies faced was pressure from the media, social 
groups, and rights movements.  These groups portray corporations as 
threats to civil liberties by promoting this belief: 
[T]he leaders of large organizations are distracted and corrupted 
by luxuries and the trappings of corporate success, they have no 
time to consider fundamental values like honesty, truth, and 
justice.  They have no time to listen to the voices of their own 




The economic changes companies faced resulted from periodic 
recessions like the 1979 energy crisis, the 1990 oil price shock, the 2001 
burst of the dot-com bubble, and the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis, the 
last of which was blamed on corporations’ risky fiscal practices.
40
  These 
social and economic changes led to a loss of public confidence in 
corporations.
41
  At the present time, “[e]mployees and consumers say they 




The cultural shift from reverence to distrust of large companies led to 
an attitudinal change toward external whistleblowing.  Companies are 
vilified before the public by the media, social movements, onset recessions, 
and evidence of business scandals.
43
  Even though Aaron Chatterji, 
 
 39.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 24. 
 40.  For an explanation of historical economic crises, see NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH, U.S. BUSINESS CYCLE EXPANSIONS AND CONTRACTIONS  (2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_20100920.
pdf.  For information about the most recent recession’s cause, see DAVID B. GRUSKY ET AL., 
THE GREAT RECESSION 21-22 (2011) (“The proximate cause of the ‘Great Recession’ was 
the unraveling of the mortgage securitization industry in 2007. . . . Our basic argument in 
this chapter is that the Great Recession happened because the growing American financial 
sector sought to base its business on selling risky mortgages to individuals.”). 
 41.  See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 76 (“A 1976 Conference Board study entitled 
Managing Corporate External Relations reported that the ‘dearth of public confidence in 
business’ was seen by 107 out of 185 chief executive officers as the paramount external 
problem facing corporate management.”). 
 42.  Mary Donohue, Five Cultural Shifts That Are Changing the Workplace, NAT’L 
POST, Jun. 13, 2011, http://www.nationalpost.com/Five+cultural+shifts+that+changing+w 
orkplace/4938845/story.html. 
 43.  Valerie Hans writes that there has been a cultural shift “toward holding businesses 
and corporations responsible for harm.”  Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward Corporate 
Responsibility: A Psycholegal Perspective, 69 NEB. L. REV. 158, 158-59 (1990).  This 
cultural shift was due to the public receiving negative information about companies from the 
media that made people suspicious of large corporations.  See RUBIN, supra note 3, at 69 
(discussing “[b]usiness’s sense of ill treatment by the media,” as opposed to “social action 
groups” that “have been successful in commanding media attention. . . . These groups lean 
for their effectiveness ‘on the creation of instant TV visibility’ for themselves and at the 
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associate professor at Duke University, states, “Americans do not seem to 
be questioning that an innovative and entrepreneurial private sector is what 
makes this country great,” Americans do question corporations’ ethics in 
their pursuit of greatness.
44
  A worker who reports lawless activities by 
vilified companies is deemed a trusted “savior[],” a superhero against a 
villain, a champion for ethics, a “guardian[] of public accountability.”
45
 
The new national distrust of corporations altered the three early 
twentieth century manifestations of the disdain for external whistleblowers.  
First, medieval loyalty to the employer morphed into paternalistic loyalty to 
the employee.  The consumer advocacy movement has encouraged loyalty 
to individual persons who work for a company, as opposed to loyalty to the 
company itself.  Consumer advocates defend people against powerful 
organizations and support consumer individualism—the ability to make 
decisions about one’s own health.
46
  For example, “the TAP employees 
who knowingly participated in this broad conspiracy took advantage of 
older Americans suffering from prostate cancer. . . . [T]he elderly 
Americans suffering from prostate cancer paid more for their care than if 
the doctor had prescribed the competitor’s product.”
47
  Consumer advocates 
also support free speech through informing internal authority or external 
government agencies about their colleagues’ illegal activity and would 
have upheld Gerstein’s service as an informant for the DOJ.
48
  The current 
attitudinal norm is to guard consumers’ attempts to ensure that 
pharmaceutical companies are not taking advantage of individuals with less 
bargaining agency than large corporations. 
Second, past suspicion of whistleblowers’ motives turned into present 
doubt about the truthfulness of large corporations, especially 
pharmaceutical companies that profit from Americans’ dependency on 
 
expense of their adversaries”); see also MICELI & NEAR, supra note 5, at 2 (“Whistle-
blowing incidents are frequently in the public eye.”). 
 44.  Aaron Chatterji, No Beef with Jobs’ Business, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 15, 2011, 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/10/15/1566367/no-beef-with-jobs-business.html 
(explaining that there has been a cultural shift to “diverge on the worth we ascribe to certain 
industries or products and wonder if cozy relationships among the rich and powerful thwart 
fair competition . . . .”). 
 45.  Ravishankar, supra note 19; MICELI & NEAR, supra note 5, at 3 (“There is evidence 
that whistle-blowing is on the increase [since 1983]. . . . Whistle-blowing may reflect a 
general trend toward greater recognition of employee rights and responsibilities in the 
workplace.”). 
 46.  Individualism can be defined as the constitution of individuals based on the choices 
they make as consumers.  MICHAEL PERELMAN, MANUFACTURING DISCONTENT xi (2005). 
 47.  TAP Press Release, supra note 1. 
 48.  See JOHNSON, supra note 17, at 20 (noting that since September 11, 2001, the 
number of whistleblowers has increased due to a profound sense of patriotic duty). 
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  Public suspicion of corporations stems from the opinion that 
“the prime objective of business is profits . . . .”
50
  Consequently, this “all-
powerful profit motive, which guides business behavior, gives corporations 
no reason . . . to ensure that human creativity be nurtured, except when it 
serves their narrow purposes.”
51
  This suspicion is amplified when 
companies like TAP are publically exposed for fraud, bribery, or other 
unlawful behavior.  Many Americans will assume that because one 
pharmaceutical company compromises values and legality to make a profit, 
other companies will engage in similar compromising activities. 
Third, the doubt as to whether external whistleblowing was necessary 
to deter misconduct turned into certainty that external whistleblowing is 
essential in compelling lawful manufacturing and trading.
52
  In a survey of 
corporate management officers, “[Chief Executive Officers] conceded that 
the loss of credibility on the part of business is caused by mistakes made by 
business.  These include faulty products, some cases of overpricing, insider 
stock trading, political slush funds, and the bribes of government officials 
in the United States and abroad.”
53
  Scandals involving large companies’ 
products like TAP’s Lupron have damaged the credibility of the entire 
pharmaceutical industry.
54
  The contemporary cultural attitude is that 
whistleblowers like Gerstein “have the ability to help organizations correct 
unsafe products or working conditions or to curb fraudulent 




 49.  See BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 113-14 (“The major problem is that demand is 
outstripping any reasonable supply. . . . The present approach to health care implies that 
illness care and life prolongation are a top priority in the use of society’s or an individual’s 
resources; consequently, consumer preferences are reordered by fiat . . . .”). 
 50.  RUBIN, supra note 3, at 1. 
 51.  PERELMAN, supra note 46, at 181. 
 52.  See 151 CONG. REC. S533 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2005) (statement from Sen. Grassley) 
(“Historically, whistleblowers have been key to uncovering waste, fraud, and abuse.”). 
 53.  RUBIN, supra note 3, at 76. 
 54.  For example, the recent discovery of mercury in Merck manufactured vaccines has 
contributed to public distrust of pharmaceutical companies.  Representative Dan Burton, 
chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Health and Human Rights, discussed during a meeting of the House of Representatives that 
because a whistleblower who worked for Merck turned over an internal memo to the 
government, it was disclosed that Merck did not remove Mercury from its vaccines for years 
after the company had been aware of the harmfulness of the element.  “In fact, the [Merck] 
memo clearly states, ‘If eight doses of Thimerosal-containing vaccine were given in the first 
6 months of life, the mercury given, say to an average-size infant of 12 pounds, would be 87 
times the daily allowance of mercury for a baby of that size.’ Eighty-seven times. . . . What 
did the pharmaceutical company do after learning this?  They did nothing.  Absolutely 
nothing.  It took 8 years before they started removing Thimerosal from any of the children’s 
vaccines.”  151 CONG. REC. H481 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Dan Burton). 
 55.  Keenan, supra note 21, at 223. 
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D. Cultural Attitude Toward Whistleblowing in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
In the past several decades, society has progressed from viewing 
employee whistleblowers with negative disproval to accepting external 
whistleblowers as altruistic heroes.  This shift in cultural attitude is due to a 
broader cultural shift in how American society perceives large companies.  
In the past few decades, as society began to trust corporations less, it 
became concerned with deterring corporate misconduct more.  A 2007 
survey revealed, “neither employees nor consumers believe corporations 
are providing value to the community.”
56
  Scandals about unsafe products 




The change in our attitudes about whistleblowing has been 
considerably impactful in the pharmaceutical industry.  Pharmaceutical 
companies are often large employers with scores of workers and products 
to manage.  The integrity of companies’ practices is dependent on the 
reliability of numerous employees.  Employees who do not uphold ethical 
standards may expose the entire company to liability for faulty 
manufactured goods or fraudulent operational systems.
58
  Pharmaceutical 
companies are constantly scrutinized because their merchandise is ingested, 
meaning that misconduct in manufacturing is potentially dangerous for the 
health of consumers.
59
  In addition, pharmaceutical companies receive a 
higher level of scrutiny since pharmaceutical companies like TAP have 
been publicly exposed for fraudulent and illegal practices in the past few 




 56.  Donohue, supra note 42. 
 57.  See Chatterji, supra note 44 (explaining that there has been a cultural shift to 
“diverge on the worth we ascribe to certain industries or products and wonder if cozy 
relationships among the rich and powerful thwart fair competition . . . .”). 
 58.  See Allen Roberts & George Breen, Burgeoning Whistleblower Considerations for 
Health Care Employers, CCH HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE LETTER (CCH), Sept. 20, 2011, at 
1 (remarking that the health care and pharmaceutical industry has become more prominent 
because of its size—it is a substantial portion of the United States gross domestic product). 
 59.  While health care products and services are some of the most important objects to 
Americans, that industry is one of the most criticized.  See Christopher D. Zalesky, 
Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public Health and Law Enforcement 
Interests; Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 242 (2006) 
(explaining that pharmaceutical products and health services have been beneficial to 
Americans, but “[f]raudulent or abusive marketing practices can cause patients to be 
exposed to the risks associated with unnecessary treatments or to be denied access to 
appropriate care”). 
 60.  In terms of health care, “a belief developed in the 1960s that resource commitments 
should be constrained in meeting the demands of individuals or the medical profession.”  
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Due to the aforementioned unique aspects of the pharmaceutical 
industry as opposed to other business industries, “in the health care field, 
where the government oversees a trillion dollar industry, fraud and abuse 
are significant concerns; so too are the sorts of illegal promotion of 
pharmaceuticals that may endanger health.”
61
  Therefore, society has 
adopted the attitude that external whistleblowers are needed to restrain 
pharmaceutical companies from engaging in product contamination, 
payment fraud and resource waste.
62
  The role of whistleblowing within the 
pharmaceutical industry, as perceived by the general population, is that 
reporting misconduct to external overseers will expose and prevent fraud.
63
  
Since “[f]raud and wasteful spending of public monies have plagued 
governments for hundreds of years,”
64
 the media has ensured that the public 
is aware that inefficient spending in pharmaceutical companies has a 
negative impact on our society’s economy.  Americans have responded to 
the cultural encouragement of whistleblowing by stepping into the role to 
become whistleblowers: 
Whistleblowers in the United States continue to expose 
fraudulent marketing practices at a pace never anticipated by the 
pharmaceutical industry or the US DOJ.  Qui tam case 
settlements, just in the United States, and just since the turn of 
the twenty-first century, exceed $5 billion.  These settlements and 
jury verdicts are grabbing headlines and garnering the attention 





BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 128.  Instead, many believe that pharmaceutical companies 
went beyond ethical constraints and engaged in immoral and unnecessary practices to turn 
larger profits.  TAP is an example of a company who has been exposed for sacrificing 
legality for profits.  Ortho Pharmaceuticals has also been exposed for considering testing 
harmful products on humans.  See infra note 127. 
 61.  Sylvester James Boumil, III et al., Whistleblowing in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
in the United States, England, Canada, and Australia, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 17, 18 
(2010). 
 62.  Id. at 20 (“In the past 10 years the United States government has greatly escalated 
its regulatory efforts with respect to the pharmaceutical industry as the interest over industry 
relationships with physicians has become more visible.  Kickbacks, misleading 
advertisements, and impermissible off-label promotion of prescription drugs are frequent 
sources of fraudulent activity.”). 
 63.  See generally id. (noting that qui tam laws would be helpful in any health-care 
system where public health policy necessitates conserving resources).  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 27; see also id. at 18 (providing a definition of qui tam action; “It was the 
1986 amendments that invigorated the so-called qui tam (whistleblower) actions.  Qui tam 
comes from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam prosi ipso in hac parte sequitur 
or ‘one who sues on behalf of the king as well as for himself.’  Qui tam laws encourage 
private citizens who have knowledge of fraud upon the government to get involved by 
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Because the public uses the method of external whistleblowing to 
expose and consequently deter fraud in the form of “overcharging for items 
purchased, billing for services never provided, and conspiracy to engage in 
such activities,”
66
 the legislature has passed laws to encourage 
pharmaceutical company employees to offer the government information 
about the alleged illegal activity of their employer.
67
  These laws “have 
been remarkably successful in ferreting out abuse and curtailing further 
illegal activity.”
68
  Due to the shift in the societal perception of 
corporations, society has modified its reception of external whistleblowers.  
In the next part of this Comment, I will explore how modern law has 
conformed to current attitudinal norms. 
II. STATUTES REFLECT CULTURAL ATTITUDES ABOUT EXTERNAL 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
Attitudes toward whistleblowing have evolved considerably 
during the past 50 years in corporate America, from the early 
days of the ‘organization man’ ethos where loyalty to the 
company was the ruling norm, to the present time when public 
outrage about corporate misconduct has created a more 
auspicious climate for whistleblowing.
69
   
The law has developed similarly.  Just as the cultural attitude toward 
whistleblowing evolved from disdain to approval during the twentieth 
century, statutes that relate to whistleblowing have undergone a parallel 
evolution.  Past statutes did not promote external whistleblowing.  In fact, 
before 1960, there were not many statutes that even referred to external 
whistleblowing.
70
  Current statutes address whistleblowing directly, and 
some specifically focus on the pharmaceutical industry.
71
  There are several 
 
becoming whistleblowers.  The whistleblower (who pursues allegations of fraud) is 
rewarded with a portion of the monies recovered and protected from retaliation.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 66.  Id. at 19. 
 67.  See id. at 17 (“In the United States the False Claims Act encourages 
whistleblowing by private individuals to expose evidence of fraud.  They are rewarded for 
their efforts with monetary compensation and protection from retaliation.”). 
 68.  Id. at 19. 
 69.  Ravishankar, supra note 19. 
 70.  See id. (“Prior to the 1960s, corporations had broad autonomy in employee 
policies . . . because of this lack of protection for whistleblowers . . . [i]n the late 1970s in 
the wake of the civil rights movement, federal and state laws were enacted to protect 
employees in private industry, including anti-discrimination legislation to regulate hiring 
and firing policies.”). 
 71.  See Boumil et al., supra note 61, at 20 (“The pharmaceutical industry is regulated, 
in part, by a number of federal statutes that permit qui tam actions if they are violated: the 
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laws at the state and federal level solely focused on whistleblowing.  There 
are even more state and federal laws that focus on other topics but include 
whistleblowing-related provisions.
72
  These laws delineate what the 
external whistleblowing process is, what proper employer reactions are, 
and what employee whistleblower incentives can be.  In the second part of 
this Comment, I will show that modern statutes correspond to cultural 
acceptance of external reporting of employer misconduct. 
The False Claims Act (FCA) is an important example of the manner in 
which statutory provisions track cultural attitudes in regards to 
whistleblowing.  The FCA was enacted in 1863 to reduce rampant wartime 
fraud against the government and control private law suits during the Civil 
War.
73
  In 1943, in Marcus v. Hess, the Supreme Court held that an 
individual could bring suit against a company for defrauding the 
government based on information he acquired from a federal criminal 
indictment.
74
  Congress, displeased with the Marcus decision, amended the 
FCA to disallow suits based on information gained through public 
mediums.  These World War II lawmakers, in an effort to safeguard 
companies from a profusion of lawsuits and prevent “parasitic” or “snitch” 
 
Anti-Kickback Statute pursuant to Medicare and Medicaid laws (about public health 
insurance), the False Claims Act, and the Prescription Drug Marketing Act.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act § 1450(i)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(1) (2006) 
(“No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any 
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) has (A) 
commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or cause to be commenced 
a proceeding under this subchapter or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of 
drinking water regulations or underground injection control programs of a State, (B) 
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, [or] (C) assisted or participated or is 
about to assist or participate in any manner in such a proceeding or in any other action to 
carry out the purposes of this subchapter.”); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b(2)(a) (Consol. 
2012) (prohibiting public employers from engaging in conduct similar to that proscribed for 
private employers); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2), (5) (Consol. 2012) (prohibiting private 
employers from retaliating against employees who disclose unlawful activities, and allowing 
employees who have been disciplined in retaliation to sue for benefits, back pay, 
reinstatement, court costs, and attorney’s fees). 
 73.  See Brooks E. Kostakis, Note, Crafting a Hybrid Weapon Against Healthcare 
Fraud: Reflecting upon the Government’s Use of the Civil False Claims Act as an Incentive 
for Whistleblowers and Advocating a More Aggressive Utilization of Permissive Exclusion 
as a Deterrent Measure, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 395, 399 (2007) (describing the FCA’s 
enactment “to cope with the growing problem of contractor fraud against the government 
during the Civil War”).  Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 to give the government power 
of public prosecution of fraud.  The importance of the FCA is that it gave the government 
authority to prosecute, as well as private citizens.  In Francis v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that an individual could not be a party to the suit just because he or she had 
information about fraud.  72 U.S. 338, 340–41 (1866). 
 74.  United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
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whistleblower suits based on “evidence or information in the possession of 
the United States . . . at the time such suit was brought,” severely limited 
the type of information from public media that could be used by 




In 1986, however, the 1943 FCA amendments were undermined—a 
direct consequence of the cultural approval of external whistleblowing of 
the day.
76
  The 1986 amendments to the FCA expanded the register of 
fraudulent activities that could be reported and prosecuted.  Since 1986, the 
FCA has been amended by subsequent legislation to enlarge the number of 
prohibited activities and increase the protection afforded to workers who 
alert the government to illegal activities.
77
 
Like the two separate Congresses who amended the FCA in different 
eras to reflect the pervasive opinions of their time, lawmakers have 
continued to consider public opinion when crafting new legislation to 
guarantee that laws mirror the attitudes of their constituents.
78
  
Consequently, recent legislation tracks the modern cultural approval of 
whistleblowing.
79
  Currently, thirty-five states have whistleblowing laws, 
 
 75.  Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1894 
(2011). 
 76.  Kostakis, supra note 73, at 399. 
 77.  Jeremy E. Gersh, Comment, Saying What They Mean: The False Claims Act 
Amendments in the Wake of Allison Engine, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 125, 125 (2010) 
(“Concerned with the loss of this anti-fraud tool, Congress amended the Act in 1986 with 
much success.  However, the courts began to chip away at the Act’s foundation as they 
interpreted the Act’s language, culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in Allison 
Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders.  In response to the Court’s attacks on the FCA, 
Congress again amended the Act in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 
(‘FERA’).  Through FERA, the tide has again turned the FCA into a powerful weapon 
against those who wish to defraud the federal government . . . . ”) (citations omitted). 
 78.  Whistleblowing laws are primarily statutory as opposed to judge-made because 
people are apprehensive about litigating without statutes protecting them.  ROBERTS & 
BREEN, supra note 58, at 1.  Courts have recognized that the proper body to construct 
whistleblowing laws is the legislature’s elected officials.  In Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., the 
Second Circuit recognized in its holding:  “We certainly have no desire to encourage 
retaliation by employers against their employees who, having failed to obtain voluntary 
compliance, turn to the appropriate federal agency charged with insuring safety in an effort 
to prevent injury or death.  But we are mindful that we do not sit as a legislature.  Congress 
has in the past acted to protect against retaliation federal employees who “‘blow the whistle’ 
on violators of the law . . . Congress may well wish to consider protecting in an appropriate 
way those who help prevent the loss of life from improper operation or maintenance of 
aircraft.”  645 F.2d 144, 148 (2d. Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). 
 79.  See Ravishankar, supra note 19 (“In the late 1970s in the wake of the civil rights 
movement, federal and state laws were enacted to protect employees in private industry, 
including anti-discrimination legislation to regulate hiring and firing policies. . . . With the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002, internal and external 
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which vary in coverage and effectiveness.
80
  State laws, however, are 
ultimately not as efficient as federal statutes since they are limited in scope 
and often only cover specific employees or industries.
81
  There are many 
examples of federal whistleblowing provisions created or amended in the 
past thirty years that have been effective in protecting whistleblowers and 
promoting whistleblowing, such as:  the Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, Energy Policy Act, Civil Service Reform Act, 
Whistleblower Protection Act, and Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform 
Act.
82
  Provisions in two recent pieces of legislation dealing with 
whistleblowing, Dodd-Frank and the ACA, are the culmination of the 
escalating cultural acceptance of external whistleblowing over the past 
several decades.  Dodd-Frank and the ACA’s whistleblowing provisions 
were enacted because, as Representative Edolphus Towns explained, 
“[p]rotecting whistleblowers is not a Democratic or Republican issue.  It is 
an issue of importance to all Americans, because they are one of our most 
potent weapons against waste, fraud, and abuse.  Ensuring that those who 
blow the whistle are protected from retaliation benefits all Americans.”
83
  
While “one should be very careful about extending the principle of whistle 
blowing unduly,” Dodd-Frank and the ACA nonetheless significantly 




whistleblower protection has been extended to all employees in publicly traded companies 
for the first time. . . . The passage of this act has created an environment in which many 
organizations have realized the importance of instituting ethics policies and codes of 
conduct to address issues related to unethical or illegal conduct.  The business climate in the 
wake of Enron and WorldCom, coupled with Sarbanes-Oxley, is one in which employees 
can feel more empowered to report ethical or legal violations.”). 
 80.  See, e.g., Carolyn Dellatore, Blowing the Whistle on CEPA, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 375 (2008) (discussing New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, a statute that 
gives employees the right to sue if an employer takes retaliatory employment action against 
them for reporting their dissatisfaction with company policies or goal); Thomas Grande, The 
Hawaii False Claims Act: A Private Tool to Combat Public Fraud and Improve the Quality 
of Health Care, HAW. B. J., Apr. 2001, at 6 (discussing the Hawaiian False Claims Act, 
which offers whistleblower protection like the federal FCA, but also imposes liability on 
whistleblowers who inadvertently submit a false claim if they learn that the claim was false 
and fail to report it to the Hawaiian government); Patricia Meador, Health Care Fraud and 
Abuse, PRACTISING LAW INST. Order No. B0-00IU 21, 75-76 (2000) (describing state law 
analogues to the federal Anti-Kickback Statute). 
 81.  See Zalesky, supra note 59, at 242–43 (“The profusion of state-by-state efforts 
overlooks the importance of a uniform federal approach—in a field already occupied by 
federal law—to minimizing pharmaceutical healthcare fraud and abuse.”). 
 82.  Ravishankar, supra note 19. 
 83.  155 CONG. REC. H730 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2009) (statement of Rep. Edolphus 
Towns). 
 84.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 30. 
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A. Dodd-Frank Whistleblowing Provisions 
Dodd-Frank,
85
 signed into law on July 21, 2010, implemented 
regulatory reform for the U.S. financial services industry during an 
economic recession blamed, in part, on the corrupt subprime mortgage 
lending of large corporate financial institutions.
86
  Financial institutions are 
financial services organizations that offer real estate services, credit or 
loans, financial advisory services, or analyze and provide consumer 
financial information.  Dodd-Frank protects consumers and the economy 
from unproductive business practices of banks and insurance companies.
87
 
There are multiple provisions in Dodd-Frank that address employee 
reports of misconduct to government agencies.  However, many of these 
provisions do not apply to pharmaceutical companies.  Section 1057 is 
important but does not apply to pharmaceutical companies.  Section 1057 
offers whistleblowers within financial services companies a private right of 
action if retaliated against by their employer for reporting misconduct.
88
  
Another important Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision that does not apply 
to pharmaceutical companies is Section 748.  Section 748 permits bounty 
awards for employees who report or assist in the investigation of violations 
of the Commodity Exchange Act by companies under the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC’s) jurisdiction due to their trading in 
agricultural, energy and metals.
89
  The bounty award is usually between ten 
 
 85.  The Act is named Dodd-Frank because Representative Barney Frank and Senator 
Chris Dodd proposed the bill in two separate Congressional meetings.  Damian Paletta, It 
Has a Name: The Dodd/Frank Act, WASHINGTON WIRE (June 25, 2010, 6:06 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/06/25/it-has-a-name-the-doddfrank-act/. 
 86.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 103 Stat. 440 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 
19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49, and 112 U.S.C.).  Democratic congressmen 
“contend [that Dodd-Frank] will restore confidence in U.S. financial markets, protect 
consumers and spur growth.”  Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. 
Financial Landscape, WALL. ST. J., July 19, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 
4052748704682604575369030061839958.html. 
 87.  Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, SEC, Speech at the Directors’ Forum at the 
University of San Diego (Jan. 23, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/sp 
eech/2011/spch012311klc.htm) (“In terms of its breadth and scope, Dodd-Frank is arguably 
the most significant financial legislation in modern history.  The legislation ushers in a 
breathtaking amount of changes that will result in a tectonic shift in the legal, regulatory and 
policy landscape affecting our markets and our economy in a relatively short period of time.  
These changes touch every aspect of our financial markets, from consumer credit to 
proprietary trading at financial firms, from OTC derivatives markets to securitization, and 
from private fund registration and regulation to corporate governance at public 
companies.”). 
 88.  Roberts & Breen, supra note 58, at 6. 
 89.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 748. 
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to thirty percent of the amount the CTFC received from the prosecution, 
but the whistleblower may appeal the award amount within thirty days if 
the bounty he or she is offered is less than ten percent of the total recovery 
from the company by the CFTC.
90
  In addition, a portion of section 922 of 
Dodd-Frank amends section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to 
exempt whistleblower claims from mandatory arbitration.
91
  While section 
929 of Dodd-Frank extends SOX whistleblower protection to employees of 
publicly traded company subsidiaries and section 922 expands SOX to 
cover employees of nationally recognized statistical ratings organizations, 
neither section broadens SOX to pharmaceutical companies.
92
 
Since much of Dodd-Frank applies only to financial institutions, 
pharmaceutical companies are not covered under the aforementioned 
provisions.  However, due to their involvement in insider trading, market 
manipulation, inaccurate auditing, and bribery, pharmaceutical companies 
are subject to the Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) 
jurisdiction, and are covered under two key sections of Dodd-Frank.
93
  
Section 1079 of Dodd-Frank expands the definition of protected conduct 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to cover a broader range of 
whistleblowing related activities.
94
  More types of protectable conduct offer 
employees more leeway to take action to help the government investigate 
and uncover qui tam actionable fraud.  Section 922 gives pharmaceutical 
company employees protection for lawfully reporting at least one violation 
of the FCA, and offers a generous statute of limitations length of three 
years to bring a claim against their employer for retaliation if their 
employer harms them after making a government report.
95
 
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank applies to external whistleblowing in 
pharmaceutical companies.
96
  The SEC has been particularly forceful in 
prosecuting pharmaceutical companies for bribery and accounting mistakes 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).  Whistleblowers can 
report wrongdoing directly to the SEC, even without pursuing internal 
reporting channels within their company first.
97
  Whistleblowers may also 
report illegal activity that has already happened, or illegal acts that are 
 
 90.  Id. § 748(b), (f). 
 91.  Id. § 922(c)(2)(e)(2). 
 92.  Id. §§ 922, 929A. 
 93.  Id. § 922. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922. 
 96.  Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 
2011), available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release]. 
 97.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-9, 21F-10 (2012). 
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reasonably expected to occur.
98
  Section 922 amends the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) by adding new sections 21F-1 through 21F-
17, the “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections” provisions.
99
  
The SEC is now required to award whistleblowers
100
 who voluntarily 
provide the SEC original information
101
 that leads to actions of $1 million 
or more a bounty award of ten to thirty percent of the monetary aggregate 
recovery.
102
  These whistleblowers must submit information about 
securities law violations according to the SEC’s rule. 
The amount of the bounty award is determined by weighing several 
factors, including the significance of the information provided, the 
whistleblower’s overall level of assistance, and the SEC’s interest in 
 
 98.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i), (ii) (2012). 
 99.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922(a). 
 100.  The SEC published rules on May 25, 2011 to explain section 922.   
Except for legal entities and the other exclusions discussed below, almost any 
individual may be eligible to receive a whistleblower bounty.  Employees, 
former employees, vendors, agents, contractors, clients, customers, and 
competitors are all potential sources of tips and complaints that could justify a 
whistleblower award.  Perhaps somewhat remarkably, even individuals involved 
in securities violations may be eligible whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank. . . . 
With some significant exceptions, the following categories of individuals are 
generally excluded from obtaining a whistleblower award under Dodd-Frank[:]   
• Officers, directors, trustees, or partners of an entity, who are informed of 
allegations of misconduct.   
• Individuals with compliance or audit responsibilities at an entity, who receive 
information about potential violations.   
• Attorneys cannot be whistleblowers on their own behalf in connection with 
information they obtained in the course of their representation of a client.  This 
prohibition applies both to inhouse lawyers and outside counsel representing a 
company.   
• Accountants are ineligible for awards when providing information about a 
client or its directors or officers if obtained in the context of providing outside 
auditing services to that company.   
• Foreign government officials.   
• Individuals with a pre-existing legal obligation to report information about 
potential violations to the SEC or to other authorities (e.g., government 
contracting officers). 
BRADLEY J. BONDI ET AL., CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT, LLP, THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS: CONSIDERATIONS FOR EFFECTIVELY PREPARING FOR AND 
RESPONDING TO WHISTLEBLOWERS 1, 4 (2011), http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_f 
riend/052611DoddFrankWhistleblowerProvisions.pdf. 
 101.  “Under the SEC rules, ‘original information’ is information that is (1) not already 
known to the SEC, (2) derived from an individual’s independent knowledge or analysis, and 
(3) not exclusively derived from an allegation in a judicial or administrative hearing, or 
similar action.”  Id. at 5. 
 102.  17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-15, 240.21F-4(c) (2012). 
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deterring the type of misconduct alleged.  To qualify for a bounty award, a 
whistleblower cannot be an employee of a government regulatory agency, 
law enforcement agency, or the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.  The whistleblower must have provided the SEC with “original 
information” that: 
(A) is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a 
whistleblower; (B) is not known to the Commission from any 
other source, unless the whistleblower is the original source of 
the information; and (C) is not exclusively derived from an 
allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a 
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the 




Section 922 prohibits the SEC from providing a bounty award to an 
external whistleblower who is convicted of a crime that is related to the 
alleged misconduct.  Whistleblowers also may not receive a bounty for 
reporting information found in securities laws mandated audits. 
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank creates a private right of action for 
employees who were retaliated against for:   
(i) . . . providing information to the Commission in accordance 
with [the whistleblower reward subsection]; (ii) . . . initiating, 
testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or 
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to 
such information; or (iii) . . . making disclosures that are required 
or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . .
104
   
An employee who believes he or she was retaliated against for blowing the 
whistle on illegal activities under the SEC’s jurisdiction may bring an 
action against his or her employer in federal district court up to six years 
after the violation or three years from the date facts about the violation are 
known or reasonably should have been known to the employee.
105
  A 
whistleblower may receive damages in the form of double back pay, 





 103.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922. 
 104.  Id. § 922(h)(1)(A). 
 105.  Id. § 922(h)(1)(A), (B).  Note that previous laws required employers who felt 
retaliated against to go through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
to seek relief. 
 106.  Id. § 922(h)(1)(C). 
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B. ACA Whistleblowing Provisions 
The ACA reforms aspects of private and public health insurance 
programs.  The ACA increases and expands health care coverage and 
quality for ten percent of Americans by regulating the insurance industry 
and medical spending.  Like section 1057 of Dodd-Frank, section 1558 of 
the ACA, which provides whistleblowers a private right of action, does not 
apply to pharmaceutical companies because it only applies to health plan 
and health insurance companies.
107
  Section 1558 is still an important 
provision, however, since it incorporates the broad whistleblower 
protections contained in the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 
2008.
108
  Section 1558, which covers both internal and external 
whistleblowing under the Fair Labor Standards Act, creates a private right 
of action for employees who suffer retaliation for intending to blow the 
whistle, disclosing information regarding fraudulent or unlawful delivery of 
health-care or coverage, or assisting the government in investigating such 
unlawful activities.
109
  The whistleblower must file a complaint with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) within 180 days 
of the date on which the retaliation occurred.
110
  OSHA will investigate and 
may order or deny preliminary relief, a decision that can be appealed before 
an administrative law judge of the U.S. Department of Labor.
111
  If the 
parties do not receive a decision on appeal within 90 days of receiving a 
written determination from OSHA or within 210 days of filing the 
complaint, the whistleblower may pursue action in federal court and 
request a trial by jury.
112
  To recover under section 1558, an employee must 
only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her reporting of 
illegalities or refusal to comply with misconduct was a contributing factor 
 
 107.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1558 (amending the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 to extend whistleblower protection to employees who report a 
violation by their employer of Title I of the ACA); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 
18C(a), 29 U.S.C. § 218c(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (prohibiting employers from discharging or 
discriminating against employees in retaliation for reporting a violation of Title I of the 
ACA); Stephen J. Mogila & Daniel L. Saperstein, Whistleblower Protections, 203 N.J. L.J. 
13, 951 (2011). 
 108.  Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 § 219(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 
2087(b) (2011). 
 109.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1558.  Note that section 1558 also 
protects employees who refuse to participate in their employer’s violations of ACA Title I.  
However, pharmaceutical companies are not subject to Title I of the ACA.  Id. 
 110.  Id. (incorporating 15 U.S.C. § 2087(b)’s procedural regime for filing an 
administrative complaint with the Department of Labor, along with burdens of proof, 
remedies and statutes of limitation). 
 111.  15 U.S.C.A. § 2087(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 112.  Id. § 2087(b)(4). 
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to the employer’s retaliation.
113
  The employer, however, has to meet a 
higher standard to avoid liability.  The employer must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have taken the alleged retaliatory action 
even if the employee did not either report, or refuse to engage in, violations 
of Title I of the ACA.
114
  If a whistleblower successfully proves that he or 
she was retaliated against, he or she may recover by receiving back pay, 
damages, reinstatement, and attorneys’ fees.
115
 
The ACA does have provisions that affect pharmaceutical companies, 
however.  The ACA extends two categories of prosecutable misconduct 
that pharmaceutical companies can be held liable for.
116
  First, the ACA 
amended the Social Security Act.  Kickbacks, illicit payments made to 
hospitals or physicians, are now punishable under the FCA regardless of 
whether the pharmaceutical company made fraudulent statements to get the 
kickbacks.
117
  Although knowingly presenting the government with false or 
fraudulent invoices for health care products and services has always been 
illegal, that action is now subject to harsher punishment.
118
  Section 6402(d) 
of the ACA demands that overpayments be reported and returned by the 
pharmaceutical company within sixty days to avoid prosecution.
119
  The 
civil monetary penalties for knowingly presenting fraudulent overcharging 
bills include a penalty of three to six times the amount of the overcharge.
120
 
The ACA also offers workers more latitude in what they can report.  
The ACA’s amendments to the FCA relaxed the constraints of the “original 
source” definition and lowered the public disclosure bar set by Congress 
after Marcus.  Before the ACA, “original source” in the FCA meant 
someone with “direct and independent knowledge of the information on 
 
 113.  Id. § 2087(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
 114.  Id. § 2087(b)(2)(B)(ii), (iv). 
 115.  Id. § 2087(b)(3)(B). 
 116.  Roberts & Breen, supra note 58, at 5–6. 
 117.  Social Security Act § 1128B(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 118.  The Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009, which was incorporated into the 
ACA, expanded the reverse false claims provision of the FCA.  It lowered the liability 
standard so that a false record or statement is no longer needed to impose liability on a 
person who “knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an 
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government . . . .”  Fraud 
Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 § 4(a)(1), 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011). 
 119.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6402(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7k(d)(2) 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 120.  See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1313(a)(6)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
18033(a)(6)(B) (West Supp. 2011) (“[T]he civil penalty assessed under the False Claims 
Act on any person found liable under such Act as described in subparagraph (A) shall be 
increased by not less than 3 times and not more than 6 times the amount of damages which 
the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”). 
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which the allegations are based.”
121
  After the ACA’s enactment, “original 
source” now means someone who has “knowledge that is independent of 
and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 
transactions . . . .”
122
  Under the ACA, an “original source” means an: 
[I]ndividual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure . . . has 
voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on 
which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) [sic] 
who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to 
the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has 
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before 
filing an action under this section.
123
 
Reverting back to the Supreme Court’s holding in Marcus, the ACA now 
allows federal courts to hear cases based on reports from non-original 
sources as long as the worker can materially add to that information. 
III. DODD-FRANK AND THE ACA’S ADHERENCE TO THE CURRENT 
CULTURAL EMBRACE OF EXTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING 
Dodd-Frank and the ACA present an unprecedented measure of 
protection and incentives for external whistleblowers.  In the third part of 
this Comment, I will demonstrate that Dodd-Frank and the ACA exhibit the 
three manifestations of the contemporary cultural embrace of 
whistleblowers as “saviors” by codifying the defense of individuals, 
suspicion of corporations, and collective concern about the integrity of 
products.  I will then explain the specific impact Dodd-Frank and the 
ACA’s encouragement of external whistleblowing will have on the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
A. Dodd-Frank and the ACA Represent the Contemporary 
Cultural Acceptance and Encouragement of External 
Whistleblowing 
First, Dodd-Frank and the ACA manifest loyalty to individuals by 
offering workers statutory protection against retaliation.  Dodd-Frank and 
the ACA remove some of the personal risks that could have accompanied 
reporting misconduct to the government in the past.  “Prior to the 1960s, 
corporations had broad autonomy in employee policies and could fire an 
 
 121.  False Claims Act, § 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1994) (current version at 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(B)). 
 122.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10104(j)(2), 31 U.S.C.S. § 
3730(e)(4)(B) (2012). 
 123.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10104(j)(2). 
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employee at will . . . .”
124
  For this reason, workers were hesitant to report 
their employer’s illegalities for fear of being fired, discharged, harassed, 
demoted, unable to be promoted, having their salary reduced, forced to 
resign or retire, or deemed unhirable by other companies in the industry.
125
 
To remove their hesitation to inform the government of their 
employer’s wrongdoing, Senator Howard Metzenbaum believes that we 
need laws to “protect workers from reprisal when they blow the whistle on 
unlawful or dangerous activities that threaten the public health and safety” 
because “[t]he fear of reprisal has silenced many workers who otherwise 
could help Federal authorities enforce health and safety laws.”
126
  Nader 
also believes that we need laws protecting workers’ right to report: 
Corporate employees are among the first to know about industrial 
dumping of mercury or fluoride sludge into waterways, 
defectively designed automobiles, or undisclosed adverse effects 
of prescription drugs and pesticides.  They are the first to grasp 
the technical capabilities to prevent existing product or pollution 
hazards.  But they are very often the last to speak out, much less 
refuse to be recruited for acts of corporate or governmental 
negligence or predation. . . . Silence in the face of abuses may 
also be evaluated in terms of the toll it takes on individuals who 
in doing so subvert their own consciences.
127
 
Dodd-Frank and the ACA are examples of the laws that Metzenbaum 
and Nader beckon for.
128
  Both Acts offer private rights of action if 
employees of financial institutions and health insurance corporations 
believe that they have been retaliated against for external whistleblowing.  
Dodd-Frank also allows employees of pharmaceutical companies limited 
 
 124.  Ravishankar, supra note 19. 
 125.  See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 8, at 1 (“Usually, whistle blowers get fired.  
Sometimes they get reinstated.  Almost always, their experiences are traumatic, and their 
careers and lives are profoundly affected.”).  Dr. A. Grace Pierce, who reported to her 
former managers that their employer, Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corporations, was planning to 
test a potentially unsafe drug on humans, faced “the loss of employment in the field of her 
choice, the financial hardship as her income slipped to half of what it had been, and the 
emotional strain of a prolonged court battle . . . .”  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 117. 
 126.  135 CONG. REC. S2652-53 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Howard 
Metzenbaum); see also Scott Shane, From Out of the Shadows, Whistle-Blowers Convene, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18whistleb 
lower.html (reporting that Senator Grassley believes these statutes are a reflection of our 
nation’s checks and balances commitment). 
 127.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 4. 
 128.  See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. H4551 (daily ed. June 20, 1985) (statement of Rep. 
Patricia Schroeder) (exhorting Congress to press federal prosecutors to act on information 
provided by agency whistleblowers and to increase efforts to reduce government waste). 
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recovery of their jobs or back pay if they are retaliated against.
129
  Knowing 
that there is less risk of retaliation will likely give workers who were once 
hesitant greater incentive to blow the whistle.  By giving employees 
gracious protection and recompense, both Acts indirectly encourage each 
worker to take part in deterring corporate violations of regulations and 
rules.
130
  If TAP were prosecuted post-Dodd-Frank and the ACA, additional 
employees beside Durand may have felt comfortable reporting TAP’s fraud 
to government authorities.  More tips from staff members could have lead 
to an even broader uncovering of TAP’s wrongdoing, and an even larger 
civil recovery for the DOJ. 
Second, Dodd-Frank and the ACA echo public suspicion of 
corporations.  Although neither statute is centered on employee-employer 
relationships, both include whistleblower provisions to offer the public 
assurance that their suspicions of corporations are important to lawmakers.  
Dodd-Frank and the ACA conform to the public’s desire for potentially 
harmful business practices, like defrauding the government and offering 
kickbacks, to be condemned by federal law.  The public would likely 
appreciate how TAP would be prosecuted under Dodd-Frank and the ACA.  
If TAP were prosecuted today instead of in 2001, the company would have 
been held liable for marketing manipulation and bribery under Dodd-Frank 
for inducing doctors to add Lupron to formularies.  Under the ACA’s 
amendments to the FCA, TAP could be liable for attempting to “influence 
the doctors’ decisions about what drug to prescribe to patients by giving 
them kickbacks and bribes, from free samples to free consulting services to 
expensive trips to golf and ski resorts to so-called educational grants.”
131
 
Dodd-Frank and the ACA also assure the public that corporations may 
refrain from engaging in corporate misconduct.  Corporations are now 
aware that more of their business practices can be penalized under Dodd-
Frank and the ACA.  This may very well lead pharmaceutical companies to 
prevent offenses from occurring in the first place to avoid giving their staff 
a reason to make an external report and expose them to substantial civil and 
criminal penalties.
132
  The DOJ claimed that:  
 
 129.  31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006); see also ROBERTS & BREEN, supra note 58, at 1. 
 130.  157 CONG. REC. S1677, 1681 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Chuck 
Grassley). 
 131.  TAP Press Release, supra note 1. 
 132.  Roberts & Breen, supra note 58, at 4; see also WESTIN, supra note 8, at 111 (noting 
that in a pharmaceutical company like Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation, which had a 
history of discouraging whistleblowing and retaliating against whistleblowers, internal 
bureaucracy may discourage employees who are considering blowing the whistle. When a 
group of researchers told Ortho’s management that they disagreed with the company’s 
slated human research study because the product being tested had an unsafe level of 
saccharin, Ortho made it clear that “‘it became politically inadvisable to go against the 
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The indictment of the six TAP employees sends a very strong 
signal to the pharmaceutical industry that it best police its 
employees’ conduct and deal strongly with those who would gain 
sales at the expense of the health care programs for the poor and 
the elderly and the persons insured by those programs.
133
   
Dodd-Frank and the ACA send this signal even more strongly. These Acts 
codify what the DOJ tried to signify in the TAP settlement, a clear 
governmental disapproval of fraud, adulteration, and dishonesty, as well as 
a commitment to uncover and prosecute wrongdoing. 
Third, Dodd-Frank and the ACA endorse the indispensability of 
external whistleblowing by emphasizing the opportunity for employees to 
assist the government in fulfilling its investigative and regulatory 
responsibilities.  Workers within companies are in an ideal position to 
know if violations of federal and state laws are occurring.
134
  Nader 
supposes that “the willingness and ability of insiders to blow the whistle is 
the last line of defense ordinary citizens have against the denial of their 
rights and the destruction of their interests by secretive and powerful 
institutions.”
135
  Therefore, “qui tam, or whistle-blower, suits have 
dramatically enhanced the government’s ability to uncover health care 
fraud” since administrative agencies have been using optimally placed 
employees to investigate on their behalf.
136
  Dodd-Frank and the ACA 
ensure that the government can continue to use private sector staff in this 
manner. 
Even before Dodd-Frank and the ACA, forty-one percent of fraud at 
companies was detected from tips.
137
  One of those tips led to “the highest 
criminal fine ever imposed on any health care company,” the $900 million 
TAP recovery.
138
  After 2010’s passage of the Acts in question, we can 
expect more large civil recoveries, since the ACA now allows the 
government to use information from unoriginal sources for its prosecutions, 
and Dodd-Frank allows the government to investigate securities law 
 
order.’ . . .  [S]everal of the team members decided that it would be expedient to go along 
with the company’s directives.”).  These statutes may give employees some assurance that 
reports will be taken seriously and handled properly. 
 133.  TAP Press Release, supra note 1. 
 134.  Kleinhempel, supra note 8, at 45; see WHISTLEBLOWING: IN DEFENSE OF PROPER 
ACTION 56 (Marek Arszulowicz & Wojciech W. Gasparski eds., 2011) (stating that “in the 
United States almost $1 trillion is lost to corruption on an annual basis . . . .”). 
 135.  WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 7. 
 136.  149 CONG. REC. S8154 (daily ed. June 18, 2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 137.  DELOITTE, CFO INSIGHTS: WHISTLEBLOWING AFTER DODD-FRANK: NEW RISKS, 
NEW RESPONSES 1-2 (2011), http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%2 
0Assets/Documents/CFO_Center_FT/us_cfo_whistleblowers_022211.pdf. 
 138.  TAP Press Release, supra note 1. 
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violations that happened in the past or have yet to happen but are expected 
to occur.
139
  After the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC expects to receive 
thirty thousand more complaints and referrals regarding violations of the 
SEA and FCPA each year.
140
  Government agencies can also expect an 
increase in reports post-ACA since, when the FCA was amended 
previously, the number of tips from whistleblowers swelled.
141
  The 
increase in the quantity of complaints and referrals to the government will 
likely lead to an increase in the amount of misconduct uncovered. 
B. Impact of Dodd-Frank and the ACA on the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
Pharmaceutical companies will have to adapt to modern attitudinal 
and statutory sanctioning of external whistleblowing, especially as subjects 
to Dodd-Frank and the ACA.  There are a number of issues that 
pharmaceutical companies should prepare to defend themselves against, as 
direct consequences of the modern cultural and statutory embrace of 
external whistleblowing. 
Institutional concerns within corporations may arise when corporate 
culture and processes are exposed to cultural attitudes and modern statutes 
that encourage reporting misconduct to the government.  Office culture 
may evolve along with mainstream American culture.  Employees may be 
more prone to blow the whistle themselves.  To mitigate these new risks, 
pharmaceutical companies will have to readjust their practices to manage 
the increased risks of exposure to civil penalties.  These companies may 
look to create a work environment where internal reporting is encouraged 
to incentivize employees to report wrongdoing to company management 
before involving a third governmental party.
142
 Companies will create 
compliance programs to ensure that company leadership becomes aware of 
 
 139.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i), (ii) (2012). 
 140.  SEC Release, supra note 96. 
 141.  “Since the new [FCA] passed two years ago, the [Center for Law in the Public 
Interest] has received more than 350 calls from whistle-blowers. Based on the most solid 
evidence, Phillips said, the center has filed three complaints and five others are being 
drafted.”  133 CONG. REC. E3538 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1987) (statement of Rep. Pete Stark). 
 142.  See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 
1760 (2007) (revealing that “internal reporting is the most common type of initial 
whistleblowing. Benefits of internal whistleblowing include facilitating the prompt 
investigation and correction of wrongful conduct and minimizing the organizational costs of 
whistleblowing by permitting employers to rectify misconduct confidentially, with little 
disruption to the employer-employee relationship. Internal whistleblowing also enables the 
correction of misunderstanding, which reduces the likelihood that the organization and its 
employees will unfairly suffer harm.”). 
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misconduct internally before too much damage is done.
143
  Part of these 
compliance programs would be a strong code of conduct adopted from top 
down.
144
  Pharmaceutical companies will also likely have to restructure 
their internal process for reporting grievances.
145
 
Complying with Dodd-Frank and the ACA will present financial 
strains on pharmaceutical companies.  Pharmaceutical companies will have 
to pay for institutional reforms to try to avoid governmental prosecution or 
individual lawsuits that are allowable under both Acts.  If, regardless of the 
reforms to avoid external whistleblowing, employees do report 
whistleblowing externally, pharmaceutical companies may have to engage 
in whistleblower suits from employees who have rights of actions against 
them for alleged retaliation.  In the past, corporations have spent millions 
of dollars litigating whistleblower lawsuits.
146
  The financial impact 
external whistleblowing would have on pharmaceutical companies is 
important, because the more money used to adjust to increased exposure to 
government prosecution, the less money will be spent on drug development 
and technological advancement.  Instead of funding new biotechnological 
experiments, pharmaceutical companies may spend increased money 
protecting themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has shown that based on cultural attitudes at any point 
in time, “[t]o some, whistle-blowers are heroes; to others villains; but, to 
virtually no one are they inconsequential.”
147
  External whistleblowers were 
once identified as parasitical opportunists, but are now seen as altruistic 
heroes who are essential in protecting society from fraudulent and 
adulterated corporate practices and products.  While the early perception of 
an external whistleblower as a “snitch” still carries some weight in our 
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 148.  Even in the past thirty years where whistleblowers began to gain society’s 
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Response to Whistle Blowers is Retaliation, 74 INST. OF MGMT. ACCOUNTANTS 2 (1992) 
(explaining the results of a study in which many of the employees who responded to the 
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Our culture and our laws endorse external whistleblowing at the 
present time because “[b]lowing the whistle, or raising a hue and cry, or 
living up to the ethical standards that are already embodied in various 
codes of conduct is part of the antidote to the poisonous abuse of power 
that is infecting our society.”
149
  While many pharmaceutical companies 
dislike and discourage external whistleblowing, “[t]he courts, professional 
and citizen groups, the media, the Congress, and honorable segments 
throughout our society are part of this enabling environment” for 
whistleblowing.
150
  These honorable societal segments believe that without 
external whistleblowers, companies like TAP may continue to contravene 
laws and regulations, causing moral, economic and even physical harm to 
their customers.  With external whistleblowers, however, certain 
misconduct can be stopped. 
Given that Americans are now more concerned with deterring and 
punishing corporate misconduct, Dodd-Frank and the ACA’s 
whistleblowing provisions are expected to be widely accepted.
151
  
Consequently, these provisions may lead to the passage of similar state and 
federal laws.
152
  Since Dodd-Frank and the ACA have the opportunity to 
receive far-reaching approval and duplication, society must consider some 
of the negative consequences of both Acts. 
For one thing, some “incompetent or inadequately performing 
employees” may skip a chance to make an internal report and take 
information to the government prematurely to attain celebrity, receive a 
 
survey questions noted that they were apprehensive about external reporting of fraud, 
adulteration, or illegality in their employer’s business). 
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(describing an example of a pharmaceutical company discouraging whistleblowing). 
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likely be widely accepted, it should be noted that this does not mean that these Acts will be 
widely accepted in their entirety.  To date, the reverse has been true.  Both Dodd-Frank and 
the ACA are controversial as a whole, and have not received broad acceptance.  For more 
details of the controversy surrounding Dodd-Frank, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., INST. LAW & 
ECON., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS 
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 10-21 (2010) (noting that while some people view Dodd-
Frank as an “incoherent mess,” others believe the Act’s virtue lies in its adherence to a clear 
objective to better regulate financial businesses to prevent their failures from damaging the 
rest of the American economy).  For details on the ACA controversy, see Amanda Gardner, 
Few Support ‘Individual Mandate’ in Health Care Reform Law, Poll Finds, U.S. NEWS, 
Mar. 1, 2011, http://health.usnews.com/health-news/managing-your-healthcare/policy/artic 
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new poll found that the nation as a whole is still split on how it feels about the Affordable 
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 152.  Meador, supra note 80, at 75. 
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bounty, or “take up the whistle to avoid facing justified personnel 
sanctions.”
153
  Internal reporting, the preferable first method for reporting 
violations, may occur less often.  Another negative consequence is that 
false or inaccurate reports may be made more often.
154
  Almost a decade 
ago, years before Dodd-Frank and the ACA, OSHA considered only twenty 
percent of whistleblowing claims valid.
155
  With more protection and an 
opportunity to gain celebrity or bounty, OSHA may receive even more 
invalid claims from workers interested in self-gain.  In addition, it would be 
a negative consequence for plaintiffs’ firms to take advantage of the 
increased incentives and decreased risks offered by Dodd-Frank and the 
ACA.  Lawyers who “entice employees to become whistleblowers and to 
turn against their companies in the hope of big bounties” undermine the 
mutually beneficial reliance that exists in the employee-employer 
relationship by causing companies to be mistrustful of their staff and staff 
to be on the lookout for wrongdoing by their company.
156
  Moreover, 
negative consequences may result from the privatization of public 
enforcement.  Shifting the regulatory burden from elected and appointed 
 
 153.  WESTIN, supra note 8, at 134.  For an example of whistleblowers acquiring a large 
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September 11th attacks.  Sherron Watkins, a former Vice President at Enron Corporation, 
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prosecute the company for accounting fraud).  But see WHISTLE BLOWING, supra note 10, at 
147 (“It would be a mistake to assume that whistle blowers always reach the headlines. The 
opposite is probably closer to the truth.”). 
 154.  Many believe that “[w]ith these new rules [in Dodd-Frank], there is little doubt that 
whistleblowers who elect to go to the government, rather than attempt to prevent or correct 
problems internally, will cause companies considerable expense, even where their 
allegations are unfounded or relate to immaterial violations.”  BONDI, supra note 100, at 2; 
see also WHISTLEBLOWING: IN DEFENSE OF PROPER ACTION, supra note 134, at 53 (“Some 
observers note that whistleblowing is sometimes done out of vengeance or in order to collect 
a ‘bounty,’ and it is naïve to see it in a virtuous intent”); Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the 
Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 
123, 127 (2011) (noting that more statutory protection will not increase quality of 
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 155.  Ravishankar, supra note 19 (citing a 1976 OSHA study finding that only twenty 
percent of the complaints filed that year were valid). 
 156.  BONDI, supra note 100, at 2; see also BEHRMAN, supra note 14, at 139 (“In many 
whistle-blowing cases, there is a considerable dispute about the facts or their implications.  
Moreover, lawyers are skilled at demonstrating that things are not always as they seem.”). 
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government agency officials with the expertise to investigate misconduct to 
workers may put too much responsibility in the hands of nonprofessionals 
who may have ill-motives or be ill-prepared to identify wrongdoing. 
Regardless of the negative consequences that may result from the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank and the ACA whistleblower provisions, the 
positive consequences that will result from these provisions make their 
confirmatory reception by the public almost certain.  Both Acts’ 
whistleblower provisions coincide with cultural attitudes about 
whistleblowing, which means that they will likely be supported and 
followed by most people.  Also, Dodd-Frank and the ACA defend 
individual workers from risked retaliation when supporting the common 
good by reporting illegal activities that could harm the public; thus, these 
Acts defend Americans from exposure to unsafe and illegal products or 
practices.  Furthermore, both Acts allow the government to save on 
investigative costs as well as produce money from successful prosecutions 
and settlements by maximizing its use of tips.
157
  And even though “[n]ot 
all whistle blowers are correct in what they allege to be the facts of 
management’s conduct,” Dodd-Frank and the ACA still give laymen an 




These modern statutes do not leave it up to pharmaceutical companies 
to self-regulate.
159
  Regulation is put in the hands of the people, the public, 
and the American workforce, who now have the duty to report, the 
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